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PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW
C. R. England & Sons, Inc. ("England") , a Utah
corporation, was named as a defendant in the Appellants1
Complaint for Damages. England filed a third-party complaint against A. N. R. Freight System, Inc. ("A.N.R.").
England and A.N.R. settled the third-party claim, and
the Appellants settled their claims against England before
the scheduled date of trial. Appellants have not appealed
any judgment in favor of England to this Court.
proceedings

before the District

In all

Court, England

was

represented by John M. Chipman and Linda L. W. Roth of
Hanson, Nelson, Chipman & Quigley, and Frederick N. Green
and Julie V. Lund of Green & Berry, and A.N.R. was represented by Stuart Poelman of Snow, Christensen & Martineau.
All other parties are named in the caption of this
appeal.
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JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant
to section 78-2-2(3)(j) , Utah Code Annotated,

ISSUES PRESENTED AND THE LEGAL STANDARD
FOP APPFT.TATF PT?VIEW OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT
1.

Does the record in this case contain sufficient

evidence to allow a trier of fact to decide that the
driver of the Cal Gas truck was negligent in the operation
of his vehicle?
2.

Does res ipsa loquitur apply under the facts

of this case?
3.

Does the record in this case contain sufficient

evidence to allow a finder of fact to decide that the
overturned Cal Gas truck was a proximate cause of the
Appellants1 injuries?
In Utah,

M

[a]ppellate courts scrutinize summary

judgments under the same standard applied by the trial
courts, according no particular deference to the trial
court's legal conclusions concerning whether the material
facts are in dispute and, if they are not, what legal
result obtains."

Wvcalis v. Guardian Title of Utah,

780 P.2d 821, 824 (Utah App. 1989); accord Atlas Corporation v. Clovis National Bank. 737 P.2d 225, 229 (Utah
1987). Moreover, this court may affirm a summary judgment
on any proper grounds, even if different from those relied
on by the district court.

Branch v. Western Petroleum,
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Inc. . 657 P.2d 267, 276

(Utah 1982); Jesperson v.

Jesperson. 610 P.2d 326, 328 (Utah 1980).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case.
The Plaintiffs, Joseph Kitchen

("Kitchen")

and Richard Phillips ("Phillips"), initiated this civil
action against C R. England & Sons, Inc. ("CR England"),
and Cal Gas Company, Inc. ("Cal Gas") on April 13, 1987.
In their Complaint for Damages, the Plaintiffs alleged
that on February 6, 1986, Cal Gas negligently operated
a semi tractor-tanker (the "Cal Gas Truck") by allowing
it to overturn and block the eastbound lanes of Interstate
80 near Wendover, Utah.

As a result of that alleged

negligence, the Plaintiffs assert, the semi tractor-trailer they were driving (the "ANR Truck") was forced to
overturn, causing them personal injury.

Similarly, the

Plaintiffs alleged that CR England negligently operated
a semi tractor-trailer (the "CR England Truck") by allowing it to collide with the ANR Truck as the ANR Truck
slowed.
As a result of their injuries, the Plaintiffs sought
general damages from Cal Gas and CR England in the total
amount of $1 million, special damages in excess of $1
million, interest on any award of special damages, costs

- 2 -

and such other relief as the District Court might deem
fair.
B.

Course of Proceedings.
Plaintiffs filed their Complaint for Damages

on April 13# 1987. On September 12, 1988, Cal Gas moved
for summary judgment on the grounds that, in view of
the material facts in the record; the Plaintiffs could
not show that the conduct of Cal Gas was the proximate
cause of their injuries.

By Order entered February 9,

1989; the District Court denied the Cal Gas motion.
Pre-trial discovery continued through November 1,
1989. On that date Cal Gas again moved for summary judgment.

In its second motion; Cal Gas argued that summary

judgment in its favor was proper because the Plaintiffs
could not show that Cal Gas had breached a standard of
care owed to them.

In an Order in Limine and Summary

Judgment entered on January 31; 1990; the District Court
found that "on the undisputed facts viewed most favorably
to the plaintiffs, no facts establish the Cal Gas driver
was negligent; therefore any such finding by a jury could
only be based on speculation." Accordingly, the District
Court granted the Cal Gas Motion for Summary Judgment
and dismissed the Plaintiffs' claims against Cal Gas
with prejudice and on the merits.
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Final judgment as to

Cal Gas was entered on January 31, 1990.1

This appeal

follows from that final judgment,
C.

Statement of Facts.
To present the facts in this case in the light

most favorable to the party against whom summary judgment
was granted, Cal Gas has derived the following statement
of facts from the pleadings, deposition testimony and
appeal brief of the Plaintiffs.2
1.

In February 1986, Kitchen and Phillips were

employees of what is now A.N.R. Freight Systems, Inc.,
and were, respectively, the driver and alternate driver
of the ANR Truck.

See Record at 3, f7; Deposition of

Joseph Richard Kitchen ("Kitchen Deposition11), pp. 6, 12.
2.

On February 5, 1986, Kitchen and Phillips drove

the ANR Truck out of Los Angeles heading for the ANR
terminal in Salt Lake City.

Kitchen Deposition, pp.

35-36. Early in the morning of February 6th, they stopped
at the Port of Entry immediately east of Wendover, Utah
1

A copy of the Final Judgment is included in
the Addendum, together with the minute entry from the
hearing at which Cal Gas1 motion was granted and the
Order in Limine and Summary Judgment.
2

Not all of these facts were undisputed below.
For example, CR England disputed the claim that its truck
struck the ANR Truck from behind, causing it to overturn.
CR England was able to establish through its accident
reconstruction expert that the ANR Truck was on its side
when the CR England Truck first came in contact with
it. But none of these factual disputes is material to
Cal Gas1 Motion for Summary Judgment or the issues raised
on appeal.
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(the "Port of Entry") , to have the ANR Truck weighed.
See Kitchen Deposition, pp. 42-43.
3.

The Plaintiffs were told by a Utah Highway

Patrolman at the Port of Entry that there would be black
ice on Interstate 80 beginning 12 to 14 miles east of
the Port of Entry and continuing all the way into Salt
Lake City.
4.

Kitchen Deposition, p. 44.
Five minutes after the Plaintiffs left the

Port of Entry, at a point less than one mile east of
the Port of Entry, they were passed by the Cal Gas Truck.
Kitchen Deposition, pp. 48-49.3
5.

At the point on Interstate 80 where the Cal

Gas Truck passed the ANR Truck (approximately one mile
east of the Port of Entry) , the surface of Interstate
80 was wet, but not icy.

Kitchen Deposition, pp. 48,

46.
6.

Kitchen first encountered black ice 14 or 15

miles east of the point at which the Cal Gas Truck passed
the ANR Truck.
7.

Kitchen Deposition, pp. 48-49, 46.

About 19 miles east of the Port of Entry, while

driving 20 to 25 miles per hour, the ANR Truck was passed
by a Toyota pickup truck.
51.

Kitchen Deposition, pp. 49-

The Toyota truck had been driving in the left-hand

3

The trial court granted Cal Gas1 Motion in Limine
to exclude this evidence on the grounds that it was not
relevant and was more prejudicial than probative. See
Record at 253-54 and 311-12.
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lane, and the ANR Truck was in the right-hand lane.
The Toyota truck turned on its high beams, and Kitchen
saw "a shadow" in the road ahead, "like a glare...from
the lights hitting on the object."
p. 50.

Kitchen Deposition,

The object was at least one-quarter mile away.

Kitchen Deposition, p. 53.
8.

Between the time the Cal Gas Truck passed the

ANR Truck coming out of the Port of Entry and the time
the Toyota truck passed the ANR Truck, approximately 45
minutes had elapsed.

See Kitchen Deposition, pp. 48-

50, 114.
9.

As the Toyota truck passed the ANR Truck,

Kitchen took his foot off the throttle to let the Toyota
truck into his lane ahead of him.

Kitchen Deposition,

p. 52.
10.

Almost immediately thereafter, the CR England

Truck struck the ANR Truck from behind, causing Kitchen
to lose control of the truck and causing the truck to
overturn on its side, injuring the Plaintiffs.

Kitchen

Deposition, pp. 52, 79-80, 96-97; Record at 4, fll.
11.

After the Plaintiffs were pulled out of their

truck, they saw the Cal Gas Truck overturned ahead of
them, blocking the left-hand lane and part of the righthand lane.

Kitchen Deposition, pp. 49, 51; Deposition

of Richard Allen Phillips ("Phillips Deposition"), pp.
12, 14.
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12.

Immediately before the ANR Truck was struck

from the rear by the CR England Truck, Kitchen was in
control of the ANR Truck.
13.

Kitchen Deposition, p. 79.

If the CR England Truck had not struck the

ANR Truck, Kitchen could have stopped the ANR Truck short
of the Cal Gas Truck without applying his brakes. Kitchen
Deposition, pp. 52, 128.
14.

To stop the ANR Truck without striking the

Cal Gas Truck, Kitchen needed to do no more than take
his foot off the throttle.
15.

Kitchen Deposition, p. 128.

The ANR Truck never struck the Cal Gas Truck.

Kitchen Deposition, p. 93. In fact, after the ANR Truck
overturned, it came to rest 200 feet away from the Cal
Gas Truck.
16.

Appellants1 Brief, p. 2.

The cause of the turnover of the ANR Truck

was the rear-end collision with the CR England truck
that occurred when Kitchen slowed the ANR Truck by removing his foot from the throttle, to let the Toyota into
the right-hand travel lane. Appellants' Brief, p. 3.
17.

The cause of the Plaintiffs' injuries was the

overturning of their truck following the collision with
the CR England Truck.

Record at 4, Jll.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
In their Complaint For Damages, the Plaintiffs claim
that the negligence of Cal Gas caused their injuries.
- 7 -

In the arguments that follow, Cal Gas will show that,
based on the undisputed material facts, the Plaintiffs
cannot establish two of the four elements of a negligence claim.
Cal Gas will first show that the record in this
case will not allow the Plaintiffs to demonstrate that
Cal Gas breached a duty of care owed to them.

This is

so, even if the Plaintiffs attempt to establish a breach
of duty through circumstantial evidence by invoking the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.
Second, Cal Gas will show that the record in this
case will not allow the Plaintiffs to prove that the
conduct of Cal Gas was the proximate cause of their
injuries.
The Plaintiffs1

factual allegations are nothing

more than assumptions and gross speculation, which is
insufficient to get to a jury. Because the record in this
case cannot support a showing that Cal Gas breached a
duty owed to the Plaintiffs or a showing that the conduct
of Cal Gas was the proximate cause of the Plaintiffs1
injuries, Cal Gas is entitled to a judgment as a matter
of law. This Court should therefore affirm the summary
judgment entered by the District Court.
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ARGUMENT
I.
THE STANDARD FOR GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides:
A party against whom a claim,
counterclaim, or cross-claim is
asserted or a declaratory judgment
is sought, may, at any time, move
with or without supporting affidavits
for a summary judgment in his favor
as to all or any part thereof.
When determining whether a grant of summary judgment in
favor of a defendant is proper, the question the court
must answer is whether "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together
with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact and [whether] the [defendant] is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Utah
R. Civ. P. 56(c).

In examining a motion for summary

judgment, the court views the facts in the case in the
light most favorable to the party opposing the motion.
Barlow Society v. Commercial Security Bank. 723 P.2d
398, 399 (Utah 1986).

However, "the mere existence of

some alleged factual dispute between the parties will
not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for
summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no
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genuine issue of material fact."

Anderson v. Liberty

Lobby. Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986).4
In determining what facts are material, the Court
must look to the substantive law. Id. at 248. The United
States Supreme Court has stated the standard for materiality as follows:
Only disputes over facts that might
affect the outcome of the suit under
the governing law will properly
preclude the entry of summary judgment.
Factual disputes that are
irrelevant or unnecessary will not
be counted.
Id.
Rule 56 further provides that:
When a motion for summary judgment
is made and supported as provided
in this rule, an adverse party may
not rest upon the mere allegations
or denials of his pleading, but his
response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must
set forth specific facts showing
that there is a genuine issue for
trial. If he does not so respond,
summary judgment, if appropriate,
shall be entered against him.
Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e).

Accordingly, the party opposing

the motion for summary judgment "must do more than simply

4

Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, is identical in all relevant respects to Rule S6, Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure. Where Utah procedural rules are
substantially similar to their federal counterparts,
this Court has looked to the federal courts1 interpretation of the federal rules in construing the corresponding
state procedural rules. See, e.g.. Prowswood. Inc. v.
Mountain Fuel Supply Company. 676 P.2d 952, 958 (Utah
1984) .
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show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the
material facts." Matsushita Electric Industrial Company
v. Zenith Radio Corporation. 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986).
Indeed, the trial court must grant summary judgment where
there is insufficient evidence to warrant giving the
case to a jury at trial and the movant is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law. Anderson. 477 U.S. at 250.
A party moving for summary judgment has the ultimate
burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue
of material fact. However, where, as here, the non-moving
party will bear the burden of persuasion on the issues
at trial, the moving party can satisfy its initial burden
of production in either of two ways.

First, the moving

party can offer affirmative evidence that negates an
essential element of the non-moving party's cause of
action.

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett. 477 U.S. 317, 323

(1986) ("A complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the non-moving partyfs case necessarily
renders all other facts immaterial"). Second, the moving
party may affirmatively show that even if the record
contains some evidence that supports the non-moving party's claim, there is nonetheless insufficient evidence
to allow the non-moving party to meet the standard of
proof applicable to each element of his cause of action
at trial on the merits. Robinson v. IHC. Inc.. 740 P.2d
262, 264 (Utah App. 1987); see Celotex. 477 U.S. at 325.
- 11 -

The United States Supreme Court has declared that:
Rule 56 must be construed with due
regard not only for the rights of
persons asserting claims and
defenses..., but also for the rights
of persons opposing such claims and
defenses to demonstrate in the manner
provided by the Rule, prior to trial,
that the claims and defenses have
no factual basis.
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 327.

Accordingly, the District

Courtfs grant of summary judgment in favor of Cal Gas
must be viewed "not as a disfavored procedural shortcut,"
id., but as the proper application of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure, which were promulgated "to secure the
just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every
action."

Utah R. Civ. P. 1(a); see Celotex. 477 U.S.

at 327.
This Court has recognized that although a claim in
negligence ordinarily raises questions that ought to be
resolved by the trier of fact, where the facts material
to an essential element of a cause of action in negligence
are undisputed, and only one reasonable conclusion may
be drawn from those facts, the entire issue of negligence
may be disposed of in summary judgment proceedings.
See, e.g. , Webster v. Sill, 675 P.2d 1170, 1172 (Utah
1983); FMA Acceptance Co. v. Leatherby Insurance Co..
594 P.2d 1332, 1335 (Utah 1979).
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II.
THE RECORD IN THIS CASE CONTAINS NO EVIDENCE
THAT CAL GAS BREACHED ITS DUTY OF REASONABLE CARE
In Utah, a plaintiff asserting a cause of action
in negligence must prove the following four elements of
the tort by a preponderance of the evidence:

"(1) A

duty of reasonable care owed by the defendant to the
plaintiff; (2) a breach of that duty; (3) the causation,
both actually and proximately of injury; and (4) the
suffering of damages by the plaintiff."

Williams v.

Melby. 699 P.2d 723, 726 (Utah 1985); White v. Blackburn,
787 P.2d 1315, 1319 (Utah App. 1990).
To establish their cause of action in negligence,
the Plaintiffs first must show that Cal Gas owed them a
duty of care.

Beech v. University of Utah, 726 P.2d

413, 415 (Utah 1986); Williams v. Melbv, 699 P.2d 723,
726 (Utah 1985).

The duty owed by one party to another

is entirely a question of law to be determined by the
court.

Ferree v. State of Utah, 784 P.2d 149, 151 (Utah

1989) .
The Plaintiffs argue that it was the duty of the
driver of the Cal Gas Truck to maintain control over
his vehicle so as not to allow it to overturn and thereby
block the traffic lanes of Interstate 80. Appellants1
Brief, p. 16. In a correlative argument, the Plaintiffs
assert that the Cal Gas Truck driver breached his duty

- 13 -

to them when he "overturned his truck and left it laying
in the road blocking the eastbound lanes[.]" !£•
The Plaintiffs' argument overstates the Cal Gas
Truck driverfs duty.

One who drives a vehicle does not

have a "duty" to operate the vehicle faultlessly such
that he will be held strictly liable for any shortcoming
in those operations, fault notwithstanding.

The only

duty he has is to exercise reasonable care under the
circumstances.

In other words, to establish their claim

for negligence, the Plaintiffs had to show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the driver of the Cal Gas
Truck either failed to do what a reasonable and prudent
truck driver would have done under the circumstances,
or that he did what such a truck driver under the circumstances would not have done. See Meese v. Briaham Young
University, 639 P.2d 720, 723 (Utah 1981).

Thus, when

offering their evidence, the Plaintiffs had to do more
than point to a Cal Gas Truck later found overturned
and beg the question whether negligence caused its wreck.
As this Court made clear in Horsley v. Robinson, 112
Utah 227, 186 P.2d 592, 596 (Utah 1947), the mere occurrence of a vehicle accident, considered alone, does not
support the inference that the vehicle1 s driver was negligent.

Indeed, in Utah, one operating a motor vehicle

is presumed to be exercising due care, if for no reason
other than to safeguard his own well-being.
- 14 -

DeMille v.

Erickson, 23 Utah 2d 278, 462 P.2d 159, 161 (Utah 1969),
cert, denied, 397 U.S. 1079 (1970). While this presumption is rebuttable, it can be overcome only by inferences
well rooted in the circumstances of the accident. Id.
Perhaps in recognition of the rules in Horslev and
DeMille. the Plaintiffs have tried to spin a web of facts
and circumstances that they believe will allow a finder
of fact to infer that the Cal Gas Truck's driver's negligence must have caused the Cal Gas Truck to overturn.
For example, the Plaintiffs claim in their deposition
testimony that before they had driven one mile east from
the Port of Entry, and while traveling at 20 to 25 miles
per hour, they were passed by the Cal Gas Truck. Kitchen
Deposition, pp. 48, 46; Phillips Deposition, pp. 10-11.
The inference that the Plaintiffs would like this court
to draw from this statement is, of course, that the Cal
Gas driver was operating his vehicle in an unreasonable
manner prior to his accident. The trial court recognized
that the probative value of this testimony, if any, was
clearly outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,
confusion of the issues or misleading the jury. Moreover,
as even a cursory review of the facts in this case
reveals, any such inference regarding either the conduct
of the Cal Gas driver when his truck overturned or the
circumstances that attended his accident is unfounded.
By Kitchen's own testimony, the surface of Interstate
- 15 -

80 near the Port of Entry—where the Cal Gas Truck passed
the ANR Truck—was wet, but was not icy.

The record

contains no evidence that the speed of the Cal Gas truck,
though greater than that of the ANR Truck, was unreasonable in such conditions.
In addition, Kitchen testified during his deposition
that his rate of speed while traveling east on Interstate
80 was 20 to 25 miles per hour and that the distance
between the point at which the Cal Gas Truck passed him
and the point at which the Cal Gas Truck overturned was
eighteen miles.

The unavoidable implication of these

two undisputed facts is that neither Kitchen nor Phillips
had any opportunity to observe the Cal Gas driver operate
his vehicle for approximately forty-five minutes before
they encountered the overturned Cal Gas Truck.

Thus,

Kitchen's reference to the episode of one truck safely
passing another gives rise to no well grounded inference
about the Cal Gas Truck driver's conduct before his truck
overturned eighteen miles farther east, forty-five minutes
later, and in quite different road conditions.5
Not only are there no facts to show that the Cal
Gas Truck overturned as a result of the Cal Gas driver's
negligence, but there are also no facts establishing
that the Cal Gas Truck was overturned before the ANR
5

During his deposition, Kitchen also testified
that at the point at which the Cal Gas Truck was found
overturned, Interstate 80 was subject to black ice.
- 16 -

Truck overturned. No one saw the Cal Gas Truck overturned
before the accident, and there was no expert testimony
to suggest facts from which one could infer the sequence
of events.
It is clear from the Plaintiffs1 ungrounded assumptions about the facts and circumstances of the Cal Gas
Truck's accident that at trial they intend to invite
the finder of fact to speculate on the reasonableness
of the Cal Gas Truck driver's conduct immediately before
his vehicle overturned and on the timing of the accident.
This formula for establishing a breach of a duty of care
has been expressly rejected by this Court.

In DeMille

v. Erickson. 462 P.2d 159 (Utah 1969), the Court held
that in a trial on the merits of a negligence claim,
the evidence on the defendant's breach of a duty of reasonable care must be comprehensive enough to allow the
finder of fact no reason or opportunity to speculate on
the circumstances immediately preceding the allegedly
negligent conduct.

While justifiable inferences from

circumstantial evidence are permissible, resort to sheer
conjecture about the conduct of the Cal Gas Truck driver
may not be offered as a substitute for a showing by a
preponderance of the evidence that the truck driver's
conduct was negligent.

Lindsay v. Gibbons & Reed, 27

Utah 2d 419, 497 P.2d 28, 31 (Utah 1972).
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So, while

there is always the possibility that the Cal Gas Truck
overturned because its driver was negligent,
for a decision imposing liability
to respond in damages, this is not
enough. What is required is evidence,
which means some sort of proof; and
it must be evidence from which reasonable persons may conclude that, upon
the whole, it is more likely that
the event was caused by negligence
than that it was not. As long as
the conclusion is a matter of mere
speculation or conjecture, or where
the probabilities are at best evenly
balanced between negligence and its
absence, it becomes the duty of the
court to direct a jury that the burden
of proof has not been sustained.
W. Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. Keeton & D. Owen, Prosser & Keeton
on the Law of Torts. § 39, at 242 (5th ed. 1984 & Supp.
1988) (footnotes omitted).
Even when the facts of this case, and the permissible inferences drawn from those facts, are considered
in a light most favorable to the Plaintiffs, there is
no evidence that Cal Gas breached

its duty to the

Plaintiffs. Cal Gas is therefore entitled to the summary
judgment it seeks on the Plaintiffs' claim of negligence.
III.
THE DOCTRINE OF EIS IPSA LOQUITUR IS
INAPPLICABLE TO THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE
To bridge the void between the Plaintiffs1 accident
and the conduct of the Cal Gas driver, the Plaintiffs
have resorted to the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.

To

succeed along this evidentiary tack, however, the Plaint- 18 -

iffs must show that the record in this case contains
evidence sufficient to establish that (1) their injury
"was of a kind which in the ordinary course of events,
would not have happened had [Cal Gas] used due care,"
Dalley v. Utah Valley Regional Medical Center, 791 P.2d
193, 196 (Utah 1990); (2) they did not bring their injury
upon themselves by their own use or operation of the
agency or instrumentality

that caused their injury,

Ballow v, Monroe. 699 P.2d 719, 721 (Utah 1985); and
(3) the agency or instrumentality causing their injury
was within the exclusive control and management of Cal
Gas.

Rovlance v. Rove, 737 P.2d 232, 235 (Utah App.),

cert, denied. 765 P.2d 1277 (Utah 1987).
A plaintiff's recourse to res ipsa loquitur will
yield only limited substantive gain.

As this Court has

explained,
[T]he purpose of res ipsa loquitur
is "to permit one who suffers injury
from something under the control of
another, which ordinarily would not
cause injury except for the other's
negligence, to present his grievance to a court or jury on the basis
that an inference of negligence may
reasonably be drawn from such facts
it

•• • •

Anderton v. Montgomery, 607 P.2d 828, 833 (Utah 1980)
(quoting Lund v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 10 Utah 2d 276,
351 P.2d 952 (I960)).

In other words, a plaintiff who

successfully invokes res ipsa loquitur does no more than
marshal sufficient circumstantial evidence to permit
- 19 -

the inference that the defendant owed the plaintiff a
duty of care and breached that duty. Robinson v. Intermountain Health Care. Inc.. 740 P.2d.262, 264 (Utah App.
1987) .
A.

The Plaintiffs Cannot Show That Their Injuries Would
Not Have Happened Had Cal Gas Used Due Care.
Any attempt by the Plaintiffs to establish the first

element of res ipsa loquitur—namely, that their injuries
were of a kind that would not have happened had Cal Gas
used due care—will place them, once again, squarely at
odds with this Court's holdings in Horsley v. Robinson.
186 P.2d 592 (Utah 1947), and DeMille v. Erickson. 462
P.2d 159 (Utah 1969).

As Cal Gas has pointed out in

Section II above, in Utah the mere occurrence of a vehicle
accident, considered alone, does not support the inference
that the vehicle's driver was negligent.

Moreover, the

driver of a motor vehicle enjoys the presumption under
Utah law that he is exercising due care.
This case demonstrates the fallacy of the Plaintiffs'
argument.

If an overturned truck were the kind of acci-

dent that, in the ordinary course of events, would not
have happened if the driver had used due care, then one
would have to conclude that the Plaintiffs did not use
due care, since their truck also overturned, in which
case they could not meet the second element of res ipsa
loquitur.

Of course, the Plaintiffs do not claim that

their own negligence contributed to their accident.
- 20 -

But without any evidence except an overturned truck,
one can no more conclude that the Cal Gas driver was
negligent that one could conclude that the Plaintiffs
were negligent.

Obviously, trucks can overturn even if

the driver has used due care, and the Plaintiffs' own
Complaint must concede as much.
The Plaintiffs can point to no evidence in the record
that allows them to draw a well-founded inference that
the Cal Gas Truck overturned either before the ANR Truck
or due to negligence.

At best, the Plaintiffs can hope

to make the question of negligence a matter of speculation
or show the possibility of a negligent cause of the
accident.

In either event, the Plaintiffs would fail

to carry their burden of demonstrating that it is more
likely than not that Cal Gas' negligence is responsible
for the overturned Cal Gas Truck. Because the Plaintiffs
cannot satisfy this first requirement of the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur, their effort to establish that
Cal Gas breached its duty to them by circumstantial evidence must fail.
B.

The Plaintiffs Cannot Show That the Instrumentality
Causing Their Injury Was Within the Exclusive Control
and Management of Cal Gas.
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
permits [a plaintiff], in lieu of
linking his injury to a specific
act on defendant's part, to causally connect it with an agency or
instrumentality, under the exclusive
control of the defendant, functioning
- 21 -

in a manner which, under the circumstances , would produce no injury
absent negligence. However, where
the agency or instrumentality is
not established to be the cause of
plaintiff's injury, or where it is
not shown to be under the exclusive
control of the defendant, the causal
connection is not established, and
the inference of negligent conduct
giving rise thereto is nullified.
Anderton. 607 P.2d at 834 (emphasis added).

Thus, when

a plaintiff relies on res ipsa loquitur to establish a
prima facie case of negligence, causation becomes the
crucial issue. Dalley v. Utah Valley Regional Medical
Center, 791 P.2d 193, 196 (Utah 1990).
The Plaintiffs may prove causation by either tracing
their injuries "to a specific instrumentality or cause
for which the defendant was responsible" or showing "that
the defendant was responsible for all reasonably probable
causes to which the accident could be attributed."
Dalley. 791 P.2d at 197 (citing W. Keeton, D. Dobbs, R.
Keeton & D. Owen, Prosser & Keeton on the Law of Torts,
S 39 at 248 (5th ed. 1984 & Supp. 1988)).

However, a

showing that the defendant was responsible "for all
reasonably probable causes" is appropriate to those situations in which the plaintiff cannot know the precise
cause of his injury. See, e.g.. Dalley. 791 P.2d at 197
(a hospital patient injured while under anesthesia cannot
be expected to know the incident or instrumentality responsible for her injury).
- 22 -

Because the Plaintiffs observed and consciously
participated in the events that immediately preceded
their injuries, they are capable of knowing the "specific
instrumentality" that caused their accident.

Conse-

quently , they must prove causation in the context of
res ipsa loquitur by showing that Cal Gas was responsible
for that instrumentality.

This is an impossible task,

however, because the undisputed facts material to the
causation of the Plaintiffs1 injury establish that the
following sequence of events occurred in the early hours
of February 6, 1986: (1) Kitchen was in control of the
ANR Truck when he first saw the reflection of something
in the road, (2) Kitchen could have stopped the ANR Truck
safely without using his brakes, (3) Kitchen decelerated
when a Toyota truck turned into his lane of travel, (4)
the CR England Truck collided with the ANR Truck from
behind, (5) due to the collision, Kitchen lost control
of the ANR Truck, and (6) the ANR Truck overturned, striking the side of its tractor cab against the pavement of
Interstate 80. See supra. Statement of Facts 55 7-10,
12-14 and 16-17.

Thus it is undisputed that the CR

England Truck is the instrumentality that injured the
Plaintiffs and further undisputed that the Cal Gas driver
not only had no control over the CR England Truck at
any time during this unfortunate chain of events, but
also was never closer than 200 feet to the ANR Truck
- 23 -

during the entire episode. See, supra, Statement of Facts
115.
Because the Plaintiffs cannot show that the agency
or instrumentality in the control of Cal Gas (the Cal
Gas Truck) is the cause of their injury or that the
instrumentality that did cause their injury

(the CR

England Truck) is under the exclusive control of Cal
Gas, "the causal connection is not established and the
inference of negligent conduct [afforded by res ipsa
loquitur] is nullified." Anderton, 607 P.2d at 834.
IV.
THE PLAINTIFFS CANNOT SHOW THAT THE
CONDUCT OF CAL GAS, EVEN IF NEGLIGENT,
IS THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THEIR INJURY
In Anderton v. Montgomery. 607 P.2d 828, 834 (Utah
1980), this court explained that the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur
has no bearing on the issue of
causation, which must be separately
and independently established. As
in any negligence action, a legallyrecognizable causal link must be
established between defendant's act
or omission and plaintiff's injury.
Absent such a causal relationship,
defendant's conduct, negligent or
otherwise, gives rise to no liability.
(Emphasis added and footnotes omitted.)

So even if the

Plaintiffs successfully employ the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur to show that Cal Gas breached a duty of care
owed to them, they still must show that Cal Gas's alleged
breach of duty was a "proximate cause" of their injury.
- 24 -

Butterfield v. Okubo. 790 P.2d 94, 98 (UtahApp.) (without
proof of proximate cause, a plaintiff's claim of negligence must fail), cert, granted, 800 P.2d 1105 (Utah
1990).
A proximate cause of an injury is "one which, in
natural and continuous sequence (unbroken by an efficient intervening cause) , produces the injury and without
which the result would not have occurred.

It is the

efficient cause—the one that necessarily sets in operation the factors that accomplish the injury."

Mitchell

v. Pearson Enterprises. 697 P.2d 240, 245-46 (Utah 1985)
(quoting State v. Lawson, 688 P.2d 479, 482 n.3 (Utah
1985)).
To establish this essential element of the tort of
negligence, the Plaintiffs must introduce "substantial
evidence" that the conduct of Cal Gas was responsible
for their injuries. Mitchell, 697 P.2d at 246. Substantial evidence is that "which furnishes a substantial
basis of fact from which the issues tendered can reasonably be resolved." Gregory v. Fourthwest Investments,
Ltd. . 754 P.2d 89, 92 n.2 (UtahApp. 1988) (quoting Wasson
v. Brewer's Food Mart. Inc., 7 Kan. App. 2d 259, 640
P.2d 352, 356-57 (1982)). Moreover, it is evidence that
affords a trier of fact no opportunity to speculate about
the link between the conduct of Cal Gas and the injury
of the Plaintiffs.

As this Court has noted, "when the
- 25 -

proximate cause of an injury is left to speculation,
the claim fails as a matter of law." Mitchell, 697 P.2d
at 246.
Because the burden of proof at trial on the question
of proximate cause lies with the Plaintiffs, the party
against whom summary judgment is sought, Cal Gas may
secure the summary judgment it seeks if it shows that
the record in this case lacks "substantial evidence"
that absent Cal Gas1 allegedly negligent conduct, the
Plaintiffs1 injury would not have occurred.

Robinson

v. IHC. Inc.. 740 P.2d 262, 264 (Utah App. 1987); see
Celotex. 477 U.S. at 325.
The facts in the record material to the causation
of the Plaintiffs1 injuries by the overturned Cal Gas
Truck are these:
1.

Kitchen first saw an object in the highway from

a distance of no less than one-quarter mile.

Kitchen

Deposition, p. 53.
2.

When he saw the object, Kitchen was driving

the ANR Truck at 20 to 25 miles per hour. Kitchen Deposition, p. 50.
3.

Kitchen took his foot off the throttle because

a Toyota pickup signaled and moved from the passing lane
to the travel lane.

When he did so, the ANR Truck was

immediately struck from the rear by the CR England Truck.
Kitchen Deposition, pp. 49-52.
- 26 -

4.

Immediately before the ANR Truck was struck

from the rear by the CR England Truck, Kitchen was in
control of the ANR Truck.
5.

Kitchen Deposition, p. 79.

If the CR England Truck had not struck the ANR

Truck, Kitchen could have brought the ANR Truck to a
halt short of the Cal Gas Truck without applying his
brakes.

Kitchen Deposition, pp. 128 and 52.

All he

needed to do was take his foot off the throttle, and
the ANR Truck would have come to a stop without striking
the Cal Gas Truck.
6.

Kitchen Deposition, p. 128.

The ANR Truck never struck anything.

Kitchen

Deposition, p. 93. In fact, when the ANR Truck overturned
after the collision with the CR England Truck, it was
still 200 feet away from where the Cal Gas Truck was
found.

Appellants1 Brief, p. 2.

7.

The cause of the turnover of the ANR Truck

was the lane change by the Toyota and the rear-end collision with the CR England Truck that occurred when Kitchen
slowed the ANR Truck by removing his foot from the
throttle.
8.

Appellants1 Brief, p. 3.
The cause of the Plaintiffs1 injuries was the

overturning of the ANR Truck following the collision
with the CR England Truck.

Record at 4, 511.

All of these material facts are undisputed.

As

the citation associated with each makes clear, they are
all set out in documents submitted by the Plaintiffs or
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derived from testimony offered by the Plaintiffs. Moreover, they offer an accurate, comprehensive summary of
the facts in this case material to the causal relationship between the overturned Cal Gas Truck and the injuries
sustained by the Plaintiffs.
The Plaintiffs have alleged that the overturned
Cal Gas Truck was the proximate cause of their injuries,
i.e., the link between negligence and their injuries
and the instrument without which their injuries would
not have occurred.

Yet the material facts disclose that

by their own words and through their own actions, even
the Plaintiffs recognized that the object in the roadway
did not bring about their injuries.

Kitchen first saw

the object from a quarter of a mile away, a distance
that allowed him to stop the ANR Truck without using
his brakes and without losing control of his vehicle.
In

fact, the undisputed

evidence is that Kitchen's

response to the sighting of the object had every prospect
of bringing the ANR Truck to a safe stop 200 feet short
of a collision. Kitchen removed his foot from the accelerator only because the Toyota made a lane change, which
resulted in the impact he felt from the rear.
In short, the undisputed facts material to the issue
of the causation of the Plaintiffs1 injuries do not offer
any, let alone substantial, evidence that the conduct
of Cal Gas was the proximate cause of the Plaintiffs1
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injuries. The only reasonable conclusion that the material facts will permit is that the Cal Gas Truck was not
implicated in the events that caused the Plaintiffs1
injuries.

Accordingly, this Court must conclude as a

matter of law that Cal Gas was not the proximate cause
of the Plaintiffs1 injuries and must therefore affirm
the summary judgment entered in favor of Cal Gas by the
District Court.

CONCLUSION
The record in this case demonstrates an absence of
genuine issues of material fact as to two essential
elements of the Plaintiffs' cause of action: a breach
of the duty Cal Gas owed to the Plaintiffs and proximate
causation of the Plaintiffs1 injuries by the conduct of
Cal Gas. After all the smoke is cleared away, the Plaintiffs are simply asking the Court to hold that negligence
can be established merely by showing that an accident
occurred.

Unless this Court chooses to overturn years

- 29 -

of precedent, it must affirm the District Court's grant
of summary judgment in favor of Cal Gas.

DATED this

/r

day of February, 1991.

SUITTER AXLAND ARMSTRONG & HANSON

Hanson, Jr.
Fred R. Silvester
Charles P. Sampson
Attorneys for Appellee,
Cal Gas Company, Inc,

(Original Signature)
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Susan Black, Esq.
CALLISTER, DUNCAN & NEBEKER
Suite 800, Kennecott Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133

(Original signature)
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KITCHEN, JOSEPH
PLAINTIFF,
VS
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ORDERS
BASED UPON ARGUMENT OF RESPECTIVE COUNSEL, THE COURT ORDERS
CAL GAS INC. MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS GRANTED. THE MOTION
IN LIMINE IS GRANTED. THE COURT FINDS THAT THERE IS NO EVIDENCE
OF NEGLIGENCE ON THE PART OF CAL GAS. ALL EXHIBITS & DEPOSITION
S ARE PUBLISHED. TRIAL TO BE RESET.
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
JOSEPH KITCHEN and
RICHARD PHILLIPS,
Plaintiffs,
v.
C. R. ENGLAND & SONS, INC., a
Utah corporation, and CAL GAS
COMPANY, INC., a California
corporation,
Defendants.

|
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i
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i
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]
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]

ORDER IN LIMINE
AND
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Civil No. C87-02515
Judge Frank G. Noel

The Court having reviewed defendant Cal Gas' motion in
limine to exclude evidence of speed and Cal Gas1 motion for
summary judgment; having considered the memoranda of defendant
Cal Gas and plaintiffs Kitchen and Phillips; having heard
arguments of counsel as to Cal Gas* motion for summary
judgment; and having granted plaintiffs' motion to publish all
discovery and having considered same;
The Court finds on the undisputed material facts
viewed most favorably to the plaintiffs, no facts establish the
Cal Gas driver was negligent, therefore any such finding by a
jury could only be based on speculation.
\j

-^ \j<K*0 -JL JL.

WHEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED:
1.

Defendant Cal Gas* Motion in Limine is granted;

2.

Defendant Cal Gas* Motion for Summary Judgment is

granted and plaintiffs' claims against Cal Gas are dismissed
with prejudice and on the merits.
The Court further finds pursuant to the provisions of
Rule 54(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, that there is no
just reason for delay and hereby expressly directs entry of
judgment for defendant Cal Gas on plaintiffs' claims.
lis
DATED thi!

day of January, 1990.
BY THE COURT:

Honorable Frank G. Nopl
District Court Judge
APPROVED AS TO FORM:

ML

R. Bl
orney for Plaintiff

M. CHIPMAN, Esq.
ney for Defendant
. England & Sons
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STEWART M. HANSON, JR., Esq. #1356
FRED R. SILVESTER, Esq. #3862
CHARLES P. SAMPSON, Esq. #4658
of and for
SUITTER AXLAND ARMSTRONG & HANSON
Attorneys for Cal Gas Corporation
700 Clark Learning Office Center
175 South West Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1480
Telephone: (801) 532-7300

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
JOSEPH KITCHEN and
RICHARD PHILLIPS,

j
]

Plaintiffs,
v.

I

FINAL JUDGMENT

;

C.R.
ENGLAND & SONS,
a ;
;
Utah corporation,
and INC.,
CAL GAS
COMPANY, INC., a California
]i
corporation,
I
Defendants.

Civil No. C87-02515
Judge Frank G. Noel

The Court having previously entered summary judgment in
favor of defendant Cal Gas, and having found pursuant to Rule 54(b)
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, no just reason to delay entry of
judgment for defendant Cal Gas, therefore
HEREBY ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND DECREES:
1.

Plaintiffs' claims against defendant Cal Gas be

dismissed with prejudice on the merits;
2.
Salt

Lake

forthwith.

The Clerk of the Third Judicial District Court of

County,

State of Utah, enter this

final

judgment

DATED this

-2 /
£> \

O^Wf

day of December, 1989.
BY THE COURT:

Honorable Frank G.^Noel
District Court Judge

APPROVED AS TO FORM:
\t\y\JLi? 6\
•JL
J^MES R.'BLASJC, Esq.
ttorney for Plaintiff

M. CHIPMAN, Esq.
ney for Defendant
England & Sons
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